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ABSTRACT: Contrary to most current epistemologists who concentrate on core cases of rather ‘spontaneous’ (delib-
erately de-contextualized) trust and belief in the face of assertions, Classical rhetoricians addressed the 
study of ‘testimony’ as an (at least) two-acts phenomenon: that of the ‘disclosure’ of information and that 
of the ‘appeal’ to its authority in subsequent discursive practices. Moreover, they primarily focused on this 
second phase as they assumed that it was such argumentative setting that finally gave ‘testimonial’ relevance 
to the first act. According to this ‘rhetorical’ model, then, it is the dynamics (by means of an in medias res 
approach) and pragmatics (by means of a deliberate attention to specifically ‘situated’ practices) of such 
complex process that is the core issue regarding ‘testimony’. 
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1. Introduction 
According to Jonathan Adler’s framing of the ‘Epistemological problems of testimo-
ny’ in his article for the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2006):  
a) ‘testimony’ is “the assertion of a declarative sentence by a speaker to a hearer or to 
an audience”;  
b) ‘the’ epistemological problem of ‘testimony’ “enters because we seem to have no 
ground for coming to these beliefs [testimony-based beliefs] beyond the speaker’s 
word” and  
c) “in order to focus on this fundamental problem, a good deal of abstraction is re-
quired to isolate” the interesting or core cases which are those that would meet the 
conditions given for ‘the null setting’.1 
 Although these three points describe, in a fairly standard way, much of what is be-
ing the current discussion about ‘testimony’ in epistemological circles, it is also true 
that philosophical interest in testimony has now gone beyond this particular way of 
framing the problems associated with this notion.2 On the other hand, it seems that, 
within this characterization, (b) and (c) are not independent points but are connected 
in a rather entangled way: if we renounce to describe individual instances of testimony 
as related to the particulars of their own context or ‘situation’, looking for an ideal de-
                                                     
* Supported by a Spanish Ministry of Education and Science grant, Research Project FFI 2008-00085. 
1 “First, speakers’ contributions should be limited to brief assertions [...] Second, corroboration or con-
vergence of a number of testifiers, who are presumed independent, should be set aside [...] Third, tes-
timony is to be the sustaining, not just the originating, source of the corresponding belief [...] Fourth, 
we set aside cases of a hearer’s attribution of expertise to a speaker on certain topics [...] Fifth, and 
most obvious, the hearer has no special knowledge about the speaker” (Adler 2006). 
2 Adler himself mentions several ‘omissions’ at the end of the article. 
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contextualized setting (as (c) prescribes) of course we loose much of the intuitive 
‘grounds’ we normally assume as the everyday explanation of our trust ȥinformation 
about the speaker or the speaker’s type and/or characteristics of the specific practice 
of testimony in which we are involved, with its own, more or less institutionalized, 
model of authority, etc.ȥ that is, we come across ‘the’ problem to be solved, accord-
ing to (b).  
 Thus, those who defend the necessity of a reductionist 3 position in relation to testi-
mony, even starting from some version of the null setting, finally appeal to such 
grounds as “the hearer’s background and current evidence” as the only possible way 
of justifying ‘by reduction’ our ‘testimony-based beliefs’. But then, why accept the null 
setting? In most real life cases we will have much more data than such a setting theore-
tically allows: even instances of “asking local directions from a stranger” ȥa very 
common case study within this topicȥ could be described in a much more empirically 
detailed and situated way than is usually assumed. It seems that reductionism, as a real 
world justifying strategy for instances of ‘testimony’, would work more easily by for-
getting about the null setting. For such a standpoint the null setting would be just a good 
a fortiori argument: if even in cases complying with those restrictive conditions we find 
some additional sources to confront bare testimony with and establish some inferen-
tial relations, the reductionist strategy seems reinforced. 
 But the null setting plays a completely different role in an anti-reductionist picture. It is 
essential for such a picture to describe the interesting (core) cases with recourse to the 
null setting, precisely because such standpoint maintains that there must be something 
fundamental and constitutive in it that will provide us with an essential definition of 
‘testimony’. For the anti-reductionist, the testimonial ‘mechanism’ (be it an epistemic ru-
le, a cognitive procedure etc.) is, precisely and primarily, what works in the null setting 
and could subsequently be operative in other more complicated cases as an elementary 
(and ideally uncontaminated) trait of our epistemological possibilities. The null setting 
seems to be, in this sense, the radical and explicit expression of a prerequisite for an 
exploration driven by an anti-reductionist conviction, the analytically precise and refined 
counterpart of C.A.J. Coady’s (1992, p. 38) first decision to distinguish between formal 
and natural testimony and focus on the latter.4 Accepting that there should be some-
thing specially relevant in the null setting is accepting already the anti-reductionist hypo-
thesis and, along that line, it is possible, then, to proceed by studying further intriguing 
topics, for instance why humans have developed such a particular mechanism, the an-
swers ranging from cognitive advantages (Kusch, forthcoming) to ethical principles 
(Moran 2006). 
 From our way of introducing the issue it should be clear by now that here we 
would like to explore an hypothesis that opposes the special relevance of the null set-
ting. The idea has already been suggested by Kauffeld and Fields (2003): 
                                                     
3 For an exposition of the contrast between reductionist and anti-reductionist accounts of testimony, see 
Kusch and Lipton 2002.  
4 Natural testimony would be represented by “such everyday circumstances as exhibit the ‘social opera-
tions of the mind’” (Coady 1992, p. 38). 
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formal testimony [...] as a form that makes explicit much that is assumed or goes unremarked 
upon in ordinary conversational settings, can give us guidance as to where we should be looking 
in these less formal context to find the element that we need. 
 Our way of putting it is that, instead of a priori considering formal (institutional, 
paradigmatically public) practices of testimony as extremely ritualized, sophisticated 
and highly regulated ways to deal with what we expediently solve, in a more essential 
format, in everyday, natural, life, we could as well contemplate the so-called natural, al-
legedly basic, practices (and settings) as not so basic ones. In fact, it is just as plausible 
to consider such everyday encounters as cases in which, under certain social condi-
tions (sometimes just tentatively), it is possible to engage in a relaxed exchange in 
which some of the typically applied formal conditions can be (really or just apparently) 
dropped or disregarded. It is the social setting that tells us, acculturated individuals, whet-
her and when that is possible and we all have experiences of being rebuked (or not 
even understood) when our assumptions about the possibilities of a relaxed approach 
fail.  
 Accordingly, instead of building a basic account of testimony centered on allegedly 
universal core cases, to which ‘further conditions’ should be added in order to subsume 
the more formal ones (that is Lackey’s suggestion: 2006, note 2), our proposal would be 
to focus on paradigmatically procedural instances, on such classical references as 
courtroom witnessing, religious rituals, speeches in the public assembly, public or sci-
entific controversies etc., in which the rich variety of social conditions, normative con-
straints (‘internal constraints’, in Kauffeld and Fields terminology) and concrete con-
figurations of authority, explain many features that tend to become ‘transparent’ (and 
problematic) in apparently less rule-governed instances. In terms of a heuristic hypot-
hesis we could assume that what we expect from the null setting wouldn’t be anything 
elementary or constitutive, but something fragmentary. 
 This suggestion ȥwhich is, as a matter of fact, assumed by most researchers work-
ing on historical or social studies about specifically ‘situated’ practices of testimony 
(Shapin 1994, Shapiro 2002)ȥ would negate the necessity of c) while offering a range 
of historically and socially contextualized, field-dependent, role-dependent answers to 
b). But, so far, the definition expressed by a) (‘testimony’ is “the assertion of a declara-
tive sentence by a speaker to a hearer or to an audience”) has remained unchallenged. 
This implies that philosophical accounts of testimony (be them more or less situated 
or decontextualized) tend to concentrate on what could be called “the pragmatics of 
saying and meaning things” (Kauffeld and Fields 2003), that is, the practices of assert-
ing and of listening to, understanding and reacting to assertions. Here, though 
ȥfollowing the Classical mould of rhetorical theoryȥ it will be suggested that it would 
be more convenient to explore the possibilities of framing the issue of testimony 
within the pragmatic dynamics of “the game of giving and asking for reasons” (Bran-
dom 1994, p. 158), that is, to examine the role of testimony as part of an argumenta-
tive practice.  
 According to this ‘rhetorical’ view, the basic question represented by the notion of 
testimony would not be, then, under which conditions we should individually believe 
(consider as true knowledge) what is said by others, but rather under which conditions 
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it is acceptable to use the fact that something has been said (in a situated setting) as a 
reason to support (in a theoretically second situated setting) the admission of its con-
tent. Hence, we will propose the study of ‘testimony’ as an (at least) two-acts pheno-
menon: that of the ‘disclosure’ of information and that of the ‘appeal’ to its ‘authori-
ty’5 in subsequent discursive practices. As it has been indicated, this is everything but 
new, the term ‘testimony’ having been present in rhetorical texts since the translation 
into Latin of the Greek theoretical tradition and always referring to a type of argument 
or proof to support a certain claim: the type of argument that the orator has not 
found out by merely examining the case but has taken as already construed by others 
(witnesses, legislators, gods, sages). So in order to understand the idea, let us first take 
a look at this rhetorical tradition. 
2. A bit of theoretical history 
Classical rhetorical theory, from Aristotle on, regarded the possibilities of using argu-
ments based on other’s declarations in a way that can be revealing for contemporary 
studies of testimony and which presents interesting points of contact with certain 
modern pragmatical approaches. Thus, Brandom (1994, p. 175) talks about two ways 
of supporting the legitimacy of an assertion: a “content-based authority (invoked by justi-
fying the claim through assertion of other sentences from which the claim to be vindi-
cated can appropriately be inferred)” and a “person-based authority (invoked by deferring 
to the claim of another)”, declaring, moreover, that this combination “is characteristic 
of asserting as a doing”. This dichotomy coincides, to a certain extent, with the tradi-
tional division contained in Aristotle’s Rhetoric (1355b35 ff.) (and repeated for ages) 
between artificial (entechnoi, belonging to the art or technique) and non-artificial (atech-
noi) proofs or means of supporting a cause. If the former were based on topics, that is, 
either widely accepted universal conditionals (maximae) or inferential schemes exploit-
ing more or less formal or material links (differentiae) (on “intrapersonal, intercontent in-
heritance”, in Brandom’s terminology), the latter made use of socially inherited, public 
material, that is, “interpersonal, intracontent inheritance”. These kind of non-artificial 
(atechnoi) proofs, subsequently denominated testimonia altogether (within Latin tradi-
tion), comprised, according to Aristotle, five sorts of things: laws, witnesses, contracts, 
torture (that is, confessions or claims made under torture) and oaths (Rhetoric, I 15, 
1375a23-1377b15). 
 Aristotle and other rhetorical theoreticians after him offer particular suggestions 
and rules for the oratorical treatment of such extrinsic material (in Cicero’s terminol-
ogy)6 whose legitimacy (or relevance) is not provided by the orator but by a previous 
                                                     
5 This ‘appeal to its authority’ refers to a general discursive procedure in which the fact that a content has 
an ‘author’ (has been uttered by someone) is presented as a possible ‘reason’ to accept it. It would 
cover cases of ordinary conversation and ordinary testimony as well as much more institutionalized 
ones. We are not here presupposing any particular social configuration of such ‘authority’. The typical 
case of the ‘expert’s authority’ would be here just a well known paradigmatic instance, whose special 
characteristics could be more or less shared by other, ordinary or not, instances.  
6 Cicero uses first the terms extrinsecus (Topica ad Trebantium, §24) and remotus (Partitiones oratoriae, §6) to 
translate Aristotle’s atechnous, but testimonia (as a paradigm) is also understood to cover the whole cate-
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public sanction of which the orator himself takes advantage. This kind of interpersonal 
socialized material is, in principle, more varied and directly subject to contextual and 
particularized conditions than the more abstract ‘proofs’ or argumentation devices 
based on logical, formal or conceptual links, which comprise the ‘artificial’ means of 
support, and therefore presents a less classifiable casuistry that leaves it out-of reach 
of a technique. From another more structural and internal point of view, these ora-
torical devices are also considered atechnoi (non-technical or artificial) because, as 
Cicero remarks, they must be handled directly, not being the result of rhetorical inven-
tion: 
For purposes of proof, however, the material at the orator’s disposal is twofold, one kind made 
up of the things which are not thought out by himself, but depend upon the circumstances and 
are dealt with by rule, for example documents, oral evidence, informal agreements, examinations, 
statutes, decrees of the Senate, judicial precedents, magisterial orders, opinions of counsel, and 
whatever else is not produced by the orator, but is supplied to him by the case itself or by the 
parties: the other kind is founded entirely on the orator’s reasoned argument. And so, with the 
former sort, he need only consider the handling of his proofs, but with the latter, the discovery of 
them as well. (Cicero, De Oratore, II, §116-117) 
In any case, the category of testimony as inherited by rhetoricians up to early modern 
times was never a completely fixed one. On the one hand, if it began as a category 
closely related to forensic practice (judicial genre being the central and paradigmatic 
case-study for rhetoric), as the classificatory lists of Aristotle or Cicero suggest, it was 
soon increasingly related to a generally understood appeal to ‘reputed authorities’ 
more than to circumstantial witnessing, and thus confounded and identified, from an 
analytical and logical more than a rhetorical perspective, with a ‘topic from authority’.7 On 
the other hand, by means of this kind of theoretical treatment, the category was ex-
panded, as an established model, to a widely generalized field of argumentation, and 
thus classified among other rational and equally abstract schemes.  
 This type of approach is already present in Boethius’s De differentiis topicis (whose 
list of topics is allegedly taken from Themistius), where the main division between ar-
tificial and non-artificial proofs is dropped and where a new standard topic ‘a rei iudicio’ 
appears. This topic will be named ‘ab auctoritate’ in the Petrus Hispanus’s 13th century 
version of the topical system presented in his Summulae Logicales, a most standard 
source and textbook for at least three centuries (Green-Pedersen 1984, p. 50). How-
ever, Boethius’s definition of the topic ‘a rei iudicio’ is not related to the Aristotelian 
Rhetoric, where the atechnoi proofs were considered, but to his dialectic as exposed in 
the Topics with the following wording: “quod omnibus vel pluribus vel sapientibus hominibus 
videtur” (what seems true to everyone, or the many, or the wise). This is a paraphrase 
                                                                                                                                       
gory: “Testimonium autem nunc dicimus omne quod ab aliqua re externa sumitur ad faciendam fi-
dem”, “We will here also call testimony everything that [taken] from an external element [source] is 
assumed in order to convince” (Topica ad Trebantium, §73). 
7 The relation between testimony and authority was, nevertheless, already present in Cicero’s analysis who 
talked about two possible sources for the testifier’s authority, nature and circumstance: “sed auctori-
tatem aut natura aut tempus adfert” “authority is deduced either from nature or from temporary [cir-
cumstances]” (Topica, §73). 
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of Aristotle’s notion of ta endoxa (what is plausible because reputed),8 but in this case 
not as a general basis for the practice of public discussion (as it was in the Topics, 100b 
21-23) but as just one of the possible means, among other rational, conceptual and 
logical devices (the rest of the topics) to be used in argumentation.  
 Although we cannot develop here this long account, it seems clear that this Medie-
val move towards the restriction of this category of proofs to just an ab auctoritate 
scheme —“unicuique experto in sua scientia credendum est” (“any expert ought to be be-
lieved within his science”), in Petrus Hispanus wording— talks about the reality of the 
social restriction of instances of sanction and the complete transformation and limita-
tion of the available social spaces and practices of “giving and asking for reasons”. 
However, we should not forget that the possible expansion of the forensic model of 
the use of (appeal to) testimony in any kind of argumentation was always present in 
the suggestion traditionally made to orators (and, later on, writers and preachers) to 
keep a collection of sayings, sentences of sages, and commonplaces to be used in pub-
lic speeches, as propositions or claims of which one can take advantage. These would 
function as what Brandom calls “free moves” within a language:  
There are sentence types that would require a great deal of work for one to get into a position to 
challenge, such as ‘Red is a color’, ‘There have been black dogs’, ‘Lightning frequently precedes 
thunder’, and similar commonplaces. These are treated as ‘free moves’ by the members of our 
speech community —they are available to just about anyone any time to use as premises, to assert 
unchallenged. (Brandom 1994, p. 222) 
From this brief historical review we might conclude that from the standpoint of the 
rhetorical, public and interpersonal space of giving and asking for reasons, the cate-
gory of testimony was always understood as that of usable testimony based on different 
ways of institutionalized sanction whose legitimacy had to be acknowledged by the 
members of the community in question. The classification of such a category, difficult 
and ever-changing as it was, tended to be based on a typification of sources that was 
also a typification of sanctions. Thus, the main distinction was traditionally that be-
tween divine and human testimony,9 while the latter was usually divided into public (or 
common) and private (or proper). This last division should not, however, be identified 
with Coady’s (1992) mentioned one of formal vs. natural testimony. In the rhetorical 
framing of the question, the setting was, actually, always a public normative one, in 
which such distinction opposed highly institutionalized and general sanctions, valid at 
any time, to the authority granted, at a particular moment, to particular pieces of in-
formation related to the case in question. If the first could comprise things such as 
“written and unwritten laws, plebiscites, deliberations of the senate, verdicts of the 
                                                     
8Aristotle’s Topics place the notion of ta endoxa (Vega 1998) as the base of their general approach to dialec-
tic or public discussion. This term refers to those claims that are plausible because socially reputed, that 
is, to those propositions “which seem so to everyone, or to the majority, or to the wise —and either 
to all of them, or to the majority, or to the most notable and reputable [endoxois] among them” (Topics: 
100b21-23), that is, express the point of view of everyone, of most people or of a few but accredited 
experts in a certain field. 
9 I just know the case of Ralph Lever’s The Art of Reason, rightly termed Witcraft (1573) that added a category 
of Infernal testimony. 
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sovereigns, edicts of the magistrates, replies of the prudent, the common opinion of 
doctors, proverbs and adages,”10 one of the possible divisions of the latter category 
would include “spoken testimonies, either made of free will or forced by religion or by 
rigor, and written documents.”11 
 Taking in account the very long run of the tradition of Classical rhetoric and dia-
lectic and depending on things like the author’s period or the particular field for which 
a certain text on rhetoric or argumentation was written, the appreciation of testimony 
as a whole and of its different classes changed. Thus, near the end of the 16th century, 
a Spanish author could make an admonitory remark presenting a field-related restric-
tion of the use of testimony. This would be tolerable in private affairs and judicial 
causes, and, within the sciences, in theology (based on revelation, or divine testimony), 
law studies (based on prevailing laws) and grammar (based on the writers’ authority):  
but in all other sciences, although it is valuable that our opinions and standpoints should coincide 
with those of the leading writers, still, because the force of reason has more weight than the dig-
nity of its source, a proof by testimony is not much worth.12 
This kind of attitude is an indication of the subsequent historical loss of place of au-
thority as a valuable scientific source and sanctioned scheme of argumentation, up to 
the point where, from a logical point of view, any appeal to authority or testimony be-
gan to be seen as an ad verecundiam fallacy (Woods-Walton 1982).13 Blaise Pascal, for 
example, in his Fragments d’un traité du vide ȥa methodological introduction to a physi-
cal treatise on vacuum that was never writtenȥ attacks, in a very resolute way, science 
based on the word and authority of the Ancients while denouncing, at the same time, 
the blindness of those who make use of reason and experience in theological matters, 
as these should be exclusively based on Scriptures and the texts of the Fathers. The 
context of Hume’s reductive account of testimony in the case of miracles becomes, 
thus, paradigmatic, as he was attacking a kind of last haven so far kept untouched by 
empiricism. 
 It is just recently that argumentation studies have began to contextualize and cor-
rect the radical claim that makes of the argument from authority a fallacious device, 
and take care of its particular conditions. On the other hand, it is not surprising that 
traditional foundationalist epistemology, whose roots go back to the times where au-
thority-based science was at its lowest point, should have been at such pains to inte-
grate testimony and testimonial practices, including justifying practices and norms pe-
culiar to testimony. As Brandom puts it:  
                                                     
10 According to the list presented by Cypriano Regneri in his Demonstratio logicae verae iuridica (1638): “leges 
scriptae et non scriptae, plebiscita, senatus consulta, principum placita, magistrarum edicta, responsa 
prudentium, communis doctorum oppinio, proverbia et adagia”. 
11 According to Pedro Simón Abril, Primera parte de la filosofía llamada la Lógica, 1587 (2nd ed., 1886, p. 
177). 
12 Simón Abril (1886 [1587], p. 178). 
13 Woods and Walton also point out: “Perhaps there is some truth in the observation that, ever since the 
erosion of Aristotle’s authority, Western society has tended to be highly suspicious of authorities” 
(1982, p. 87). 
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Classical foundationalism considers only justifying in the narrow sense of an inferential activity, 
not in the broader sense of vindication that includes the communicational dimension appealed to 
by deferential entitling (the authority of testimony). (1994, pp. 204-205) 
3. Dynamical aspects: the in medias res approach 
Now, assuming that an account of testimony should have to do with the two phases 
we have described, it has been suggested14 that the possibilities regarding the second 
phase would be determined by the conditions under which the first occurs. That is, 
testimony would become more or less ‘usable’, liable to be appealed to, if it was ensu-
red that it had been disclosed within a setting to which we could assign some principle 
of veracity, sincerity, accuracy and, of course, credulity on the part of the receiver15. 
This would take us back again to the analysis of a single act of communication and to 
the “the pragmatics of saying and meaning things”. The second act (paradigmatically 
an argumentation based on some kind of testimony) would become an independent 
practice selecting from the vast collection of what has been said the most suitable spe-
cimens for its own context. 
 But that independence is not, to our view, a very realistic hypothesis. Our discursi-
ve practices are but too conscious of the possible subsequent uses of our claims. The 
legal warning “anything you say may be used against you” just makes explicit, in a rat-
her tight situation, something that governs our interchanges, for good just as well as 
for worse. There are, in this sense, risks to be taken when we talk and make claims but 
also the opportunity to influence reality. We “have the right to remain silent” but then 
we would take little part in social life and communication. The interrelation between 
both sides of the testimonial issue can be more or less explicit. For example, when a 
public figure tells the press after some assertion “and you can quote me on that”, she 
is trying to control what we have called the ‘second phase’ in the course of the first 
one. A less distressing example of such a purpose could be the hundreds of different 
situations in which we may ask “why do you want to know?” or “why do you ask?” 
before answering some question. 
 In general, we can say that our practices of asserting and telling things are also 
shaped by expectations about possible subsequent uses of our testimony... and vice 
versa. That is why we find a certain advantage in the complications of a dynamical and 
in medias res approach ȥas opposed to a genealogical oneȥ that would elude giving a 
definite and global priority to any of the two settings. Both our utterances and the in-
stances of their subsequent use take place in an already working discursive society in 
which previous testimonies have already become, to a greater or lesser degree, part of 
what is shared and has been sanctioned for certain uses by the community, in such a 
                                                     
14 It was Prof. F.J. Kauffeld who made that remark when I presented a version of this paper (Olmos 
2007) during the last OSSA (Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation) Conference (Windsor, Canada, 
June 2007). 
15 Kauffeld and Fields (2003) try to establish a contrast between practices of gossip and practices of re-
sponsible testimony, the latter including in their definition a condition of sincerity. 
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way that new claims enter the field of communication with certain aspirations —to at-
tain particular positions— and, so to say, against an immense contrast background.  
 The tradition of Classical rhetoric was particularly interested in what a trained orator 
would subsequently do with received (testimonial) material and that is why, within it, 
the dominion of spoken testimony was placed as contiguous to that of agreed princi-
ples, written laws and common notions (adages, proverbs, sententiae), considering that 
the discursive ability to use these different sources in justifying a standpoint was so-
mehow that wide-ranging. Although a certain attention was paid to the conditions in 
which testimony was first given and received, the main concept explored was that of 
the conventional ‘authority’ of the testifier, either natural or circumstantial (Cicero, 
Topica, §73), without really taking into account the link between the different settings 
involved. In very broad terms, we can say that, in its approach to testimony, Classical 
rhetoric focused on the ‘appeal’ phase and neglected, up to a certain point, the ‘disclo-
sure’ one just as contemporary epistemology has done the opposite. 
 We can correct those biases by trying to be aware of the dynamic aspects of an on-
going social interaction in which particular pieces of information, from different sour-
ces, are listened to, accepted, put into use, brought out or remembered, all these acts 
or practices pointing to different perspectives on testimony.  
4. Pragmatical accounts and situated practices 
This dynamic approach implies, though, a real trouble for pragmatical accounts of 
testimony as we realize that we have to take care of various settings whose 
interrelations might be more or less intricate. The explicitness of the examples offered 
in the last section just show us a rather straightforward way in which an instance of 
testimony and its subsequent use could be coupled. But other cases might be much 
more complex.  
 In his vindication of contextualism as a means to overcome the opposition between 
reductionist and anti-reductionist accounts of testimony as best serving epistemic require-
ments, N. Vassallo (2006) has suggested that it will be mainly the contextual ‘import’ 
and ‘consequence’ of the content of the claim that will make us decide whether we 
should apply to it a strict checking procedure (identified as a kind of reductionist strat-
egy) or be satisfied with a simple (anti-reductionist) acceptance. This is, of course, rather 
schematic and we could easily build intuitive cases in which precisely the import, con-
sequence ȥand urgencyȥ of a matter would lead us to ‘blind’ acceptance, but, at least, 
it gives us a kind of starting point to avoid the, to our view, exaggerated aspirations of 
any globalist standpoint. 
 It seems that what could help us here would be an approach in terms of different 
social interrelated practices both of claiming (testifying) and using testimony as a justi-
fying means, tacitly acknowledged as such, in principle, by those who take part in 
them. Joseph Rouse (2007) has defended the relevance of a normative ȥas opposed to 
a rule-governed or regularity-exhibitingȥ conception of practices in terms of “ac-
countability to what is at issue and at stake in a practice”. His main argument being 
that such a conception would allow us to understand practices and their normativity 
“without having to posit stable meanings, rules, norms, or presuppositions underlying 
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the manifest diversity of social life”. This is, in fact, very useful when we are dealing 
with such manifestly ubiquitous and varied performances as those we analyze under 
the heading of testimony. 
 According to such a characterization, practices of testimony would be, thus, those 
that can be suitably accounted for as being an integral part of a socially comprehensive 
ongoing operation of using others’ words in order to support our discursive argumenta-
tions and supplying others with words for the same purpose (if we agree that this is 
what is ‘at stake’ in testimony). Brandom typifies, thus, a paradigmatic notion of that 
kind of discursive heritage:  
Putting a sentence forward in the public arena as true is something one interlocutor can do to 
make that sentence available for others to use in making further assertions. (1994, p. 170) 
But in order to be more specific about what (in our opinion) is ‘at stake’ in testimonial 
practices we suggest that we substitute this ‘as true’ for something like ‘as quotable’ or 
‘as further usable’, a characteristic that may depend or not (or, al least, not essentially) 
on its truthfulness. For example, regardless of its plausibility or truthfulness, testimony 
obtained under pressure or torture, for example, is not (nowadays) admissible in court 
and will not be part of what is mentioned in the verdict’s justificatory paragraphs. In 
such a case, a certain legal norm deactivates the testimonial character of an utterance. 
Of course, it will be different in other settings (scientific or others) and truthfulness 
might be in many of them considered a necessary part of the notion of ‘quotability’. It 
can be claimed that ‘truthfulness’ will normally be considered as one of ‘quotability’s 
paradigmatic notes, but they represent different concepts and our position here is that 
something as ‘quotability’ or better ‘usability “in the game of giving and asking for rea-
sons”’ is what is characteristic of testimonial practices. We see, then, the relevance of 
the specific normativity involved in different ‘situated’ practices of testimony. Practi-
ces that change over time (and social configurations) in terms of the requirements they 
put on people’s utterances in order to classify them under the notion of ‘quotable’ or 
‘usable’ ȥof course not in general but in relation to that practiceȥ, that is, under the 
notion of testimony.  
 In this sense some empirical studies as, for example, those performed within the 
area of argumentation theory in relation to the relative acceptability of certain types of 
‘authority based arguments’ in different settings become specially relevant for the issue 
of testimony. Although, in these cases, the tests might be conceived as measuring de-
grees of persuasiveness, in the limit, the loss of persuasive capacity for a certain kind 
of argumentation based on the word of others will be equivalent to the loss of their 
testimonial role (and the contrary move is of course equally possible). Just to illustrate 
this type of research, we can mention a recent study (Hornikx 2007) that reveals even 
national differences within contemporary Europe in the evaluation of the authority of 
testimony that supports applications for research project funding. While in some 
countries (France, in this case) the authority of academic titles is still decisive, in oth-
ers (the Netherlands) it is personal experience that makes an ‘expert’ and, therefore, it 
is that trait what becomes the required condition for an admissible and ‘quotable’ tes-
tifier in such a setting.  
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5. Conclusion. A rhetorical approach 
What we have tried to defend here is that in order to understand the issues really 
posed by testimony to our conceptions of knowledge, justification and other related 
topics, we should start by looking at the dynamics of the social discursive practices of 
testimony use, appeal and sanction within the game of giving and asking for reasons. 
Once we assume that what is ‘at stake’ in the phenomenon of testimony is social (sub-
sequent and also previous) sharing, heritage, use and quotability in different settings, 
the picture of the instant belief or non-belief in the face of an (almost seen as) uncon-
strained and uncaused assertion looses its centrality here;16 it does as soon as we start 
shifting our attention:  
1) from ideal and theoretically unattainable conditions of inner, individual ac-
ceptance to externalized and communicable conditions of discursive support in 
socialized settings,  
2) from internally assumed all-embracing principles of veracity or credulity to 
conscious participation in dynamic and interrelated practices of mutual appeal 
and support,  
3) from static evaluation of mere accuracy or truthfulness to dynamic estimation 
of context-related quotability and usefulness.  
These could be, among others, some of the perspectives opened by a rhetorical ap-
proach to testimony. 
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